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Abstract
Pursuing social justice in education raises ethical questions about teaching practice that have not
been fully addressed in the social justice literature. Hytten (2015) initiated a valuable way forward in
developing an ethics of social justice educators, drawing on virtue ethics.
In this paper, I provide additional support to this effort by arguing that a virtue approach to ethics of
teaching is in fact compatible with responsiveness to social context in teaching. I then propose a refined
framework for considering the virtues of teachers, one which asks us to identify virtues relevant to teaching within the broad categories of intellectual and moral virtue. For any potential virtue of social justice
educators, we should then consider (a) its characteristic psychology, (b) its relationship to the aim of
social justice, and (c) both the internal and external conditions for its success. I use this framework to
elaborate one particular intellectual virtue in teaching for social justice, open-mindedness.
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ducation for social justice has a long history in the
United States and has gained prominence as a primary
aim of schooling. Our teachers are tasked with
promoting social justice in their classrooms. Pursuing this educational aim raises ethical questions about teaching practice, questions
that have not been fully addressed in the social justice literature. In
her article “Ethics in Teaching for Democracy and Social Justice,”
Hytten (2015) suggested drawing on work in ethics of teaching as a
resource for social justice teachers. By bridging these two literatures,
she suggested a productive way forward in developing an “ethics of
activist teaching” (p. 2).
Educators for social justice must balance their aim of promoting social justice and their responsibility not to indoctrinate
students. Hytten (2015) proposed consideration of the ethics of
teaching—with particular attention to virtue ethics in philosophy
of education—as a tool for striking this balance. Drawing on
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Sockett’s (2009) work conceptualizing teacher dispositions as
virtues, Hytten suggested dividing virtues of teachers into three
categories and discussed one example in each category: reflective
humility in the category of character, open-mindedness in the
category of intellect, and sympathetic attentiveness in the category
of care. However, Hytten hedged on the value of virtue ethics,
pointing to “the universal language of virtues” that does not give
adequate attention to context (p. 6). She proposed considering
virtues as a way to prompt reflection but stopped short of
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presenting a principled argument for the value of virtues in social
justice education.
Here, I expand on Hytten’s (2015) consideration of ethics in
social justice education by first arguing that a virtue approach to
ethics of teaching is in fact compatible with giving due regard the
role of social context in teaching. I then suggest that using insights
from philosophical work in virtue ethics and virtue epistemology
provides a useful means of refining the framework that Sockett
(2009) proposed and Hytten utilized in discussion of ethics in
teaching. Rather than dividing virtues into the overlapping
categories of character, intellect, and care, I propose a simplified
consideration into intellectual and moral virtues that support
social justice.
Philosophical work on moral and intellectual virtue then
provides tools for further developing an ethics of social justice
education. For any proposed virtue of educators for social justice,
we should consider (a) its characteristic psychology, (b) its
relationship to the aim of social justice, and (c) both the internal
and external conditions for its success. Attending to these conditions for success builds the importance of context into the resulting
teacher ethics. In the final substantive section, I take open-
mindedness—which Hytten (2015) considered as an intellectual
virtue—and demonstrate how the virtue framework I suggest can
be used to elaborate particular virtues of social justice educators.

Virtues and Social Justice Education
Accreditation frameworks for teacher preparation focus on the
knowledge, skills, and dispositions that teacher candidates should
acquire. The emphasis on dispositions opens the door for considering the virtues of teaching. The conception of disposition relevant
to teaching is that of “dispositions to act with awareness and
intention” where “judgment is always necessary, as dispositions
don’t dictate their own application” (Sockett, 2009, p. 295). Take as
an example, fairness—a professional disposition identified in the
standards of the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher
Education (2008). Teachers who are disposed to be fair are
predicted to act in ways that are fair; they are aware that they are
being fair and intend for their actions to promote fairness. These
fair teachers must use their professional judgment to determine
which actions promote fairness based on the particular context.
Virtues are a particular subset of dispositions. As presented by
Sockett (2009), virtues are dispositions that are intrinsically
motivated, result from the individual’s initiative, and require
overcoming internal and external obstacles (p. 296). Fairness
understood as a virtue requires that fair teachers are intrinsically
motivated to treat students fairly and are not motivated, say, solely
by external assessments. Fair teachers seek to be fair across various
teaching contexts and work to overcome obstacles that challenge
their enactment of fairness.
Considering virtues is a useful approach to identifying
desirable dispositions of teachers when taking into account both
their moral and their intellectual obligations to students. Virtues
are internal to a community of practice with a shared good
(MacIntyre, 1985). The identification of virtues is role contingent;
that is, the set of virtues of teachers will differ from the set of virtues
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of political leaders or scientists. Teachers play a central role in both
the intellectual and the moral quality of students’ educational
experiences (Hytten, 2015, p. 3). Considering this multifaceted role,
both intellectual and moral virtues valuable in teaching may be
identified. In considering the ethics of teaching for social justice in
particular, the set of virtues identified should be responsive to the
aim of social justice and teachers’ role in achieving this aim.
Hytten (2015) presented a virtue approach to teacher ethics as
a tool for reflection on social justice educators’ ethical responsibilities but at the same time acknowledged concerns that virtue
theories may be too individualistic or too universalizing. She
worried about identifying a set of virtues as universally valuable to
teachers and about identifying what it means to enact these virtues
in a universal way that ignores contextual differences. I respond
briefly to these worries.
By our understanding virtue ethics as role dependent and
specific to a community of practice, space is made for consideration of context. Although all people may not agree on the characteristics that are virtuous or the behaviors that exhibit them, an
ethics of teaching for social justice only requires that social justice
educators identify virtues within their communities of practice.
Virtue ethics as described above is responsive to person and
situation, as opposed to universal rule-based (deontological)
systems of ethics or codes of professional conduct. Identifying the
virtues of social justice educators requires identifying those
dispositions that support social justice. If we identify compassion
or open-mindedness as valuable traits in the pursuit of social
justice, we still leave open the question of how teachers should act
in any given situation to be compassionate or open-minded. Virtue
ethics requires individual judgment based on context as the
individual seeks to be virtuous.
Now consider individual responsibility in virtue ethics. For
any virtue, there may be both internal and external obstacles to its
development and exercise. On the one hand, virtuous agents must
overcome these obstacles, placing responsibility at the individual
level. On the other hand, teachers are only one part of education
systems seeking social justice. If obstacles exist in the system that
prevent teachers from exercising the virtues that support justice,
then consideration of virtue ethics points to the need for systemic
change. Take, for example, an education system that evaluates
teachers solely on the basis of student achievement on standardized assessments. At the same time, these teachers still are expected
to be fair and to help all students learn. By considering the conditions needed to support teaching virtues, we can identify ethical
responsibilities beyond the individual as well. I elaborate on these
conditions below.

A Framework for Virtues in Teaching
Taking virtue ethics as a useful approach in considering the ethical
obligations of educators and, in particular, educators for social
justice, we may choose to use different conceptual frameworks for
developing an ethics of teaching. Hytten (2015) followed Sockett
(2009) in using three—admittedly overlapping—categories of
virtues: character, intellect, and care. Both Sockett and Hytten have
justified these categories by stating that they are relevant to
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teachers. Sockett explained the utility of this framework as follows:
“Character describes the kind of person the teacher is. Intellect is
the teacher’s stock-in-trade, however the curriculum is construed.
Teachers have children placed in their care” (p. 296, original
emphasis). Although I do not disagree that each of these categories
as described is relevant to teaching, the lack of conceptual clarity in
their delineation raises questions about the value of this categorization as a foundation for an ethics of teaching. The category of
character appears to cover both moral and intellectual virtues, as
evidenced in Hytten’s discussion of reflective humility as an
example of both moral and intellectual components. Intellect, then,
appears to focus more narrowly on intellectual virtue, and finally,
care seems like a particular type of moral virtue concerned with
teachers’ relationships to students.
I suggest simplifying and clarifying this framework to
include the intellectual and moral virtues of teachers. Intellectual
virtues are the characteristics of good persons qua learners, the
characteristics of individuals who pursue epistemic goods in
admirable ways; moral virtues are the characteristics of good
persons qua persons. Both of these broad categories are relevant
to teachers, who have both moral and intellectual responsibilities
with regards to students. Using these broad categories, we may
consider teachers as a community of practice in order to identify
the individual virtues that are part of an ethics of teaching. Any
proposed virtue for educators should play a role in promoting the
aims of the education community (e.g., social justice).
Beginning with the broad categories of intellectual and
moral virtue, I suggest bringing in insights from philosophical
work on virtue ethics (e.g., Foot, 2002; MacIntyre, 1985) and the
growing subfield of virtue epistemology (e.g., Baehr, 2011;
Montmarquet, 1987; Zagzebski, 1996). Virtues are intrinsically
motivated and require overcoming obstacles both internally and
in the world. For any proposed virtue of social justice educators, we
should, thus, consider (a) its characteristic motive, and (b) both the
internal and the external conditions for its success.
Let me expand taking the category of intellectual virtue. In
identifying the characteristic motive for any particular intellectual
virtue, we should consider the requisite characteristics at two levels:
those that are shared by all intellectual virtues and those that are
specific to the virtue under consideration (Adler, 2004; Baehr, 2011;
Montmarquet, 1987; Zagzebski, 1996). All intellectual virtues share
a common aim involving some form of attachment to the epistemic
good (e.g., knowledge and understanding). For Zagzebski (1996),
this attachment to the epistemic good comes in the form of
motivation. In addition to this general aim, each individual
intellectual virtue also has a specific motive or characteristic
psychology that identifies the way in which it contributes to the
pursuit of the epistemic goods of knowledge and/or understanding.
It is the specific motive or psychological character that distinguishes one intellectual virtue from another.
In addition to these motivational components, intellectual
virtues may also require conditions for success, which may include
either internal or external requirements. Internal success raises
questions about intrapersonal conditions. It may involve overcoming psychological obstacles that prevent one from achieving the
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aims of the virtue, such as being incapable of expanding one’s
understanding due to fear of opening up one’s worldview to change.
External success, on the other hand, is concerned with interpersonal, contextual, and societal conditions. It may involve overcoming obstacles in the world, such as working within an education
system with limited resources. Within virtue epistemology, there is
debate about whether reliability is a necessary component of virtue,
whether intellectual virtues must reliably lead to the epistemic
good (Baehr, 2007). For the purpose of identifying a useful
framework for considering the virtues of teachers, we need not
answer this question. Regardless of whether reliable success is
necessary for attributions of the virtue, attending to the internal
and external conditions that inhibit or support virtuous teaching
will provide valuable insight for individual teachers and for schools
and systems of education.
In developing an ethics of teaching for social justice that uses this
virtue framework, we need to identify intellectual and moral virtues
that contribute to the aim of social justice. For each relevant virtue, the
first task is to understand its characteristic motive, and the second is to
examine why it is important for social justice. Third, we should
consider the conditions needed for teachers to successfully follow
through on this motive across different contexts, attending to both
internal and external conditions for success.

Open-Mindedness as an
Intellectual Virtue of Teachers
Let’s now consider open-mindedness, which Hytten (2015)
explored as an example of virtue in the category of intellect. I use
the framework outlined above, demonstrating its utility in informing our understanding of individual virtues and the conditions
needed to support them. Open-mindedness is worthy of further
exploration because it is widely valued by virtue epistemologists as
a vital intellectual virtue and by philosophers of education as a vital
disposition of teachers as well as an important educational aim for
students.
Let us begin by considering the motives that are associated
with open-mindedness. As an intellectual virtue, open-mindedness
is directed at the epistemic good. Much discussion of open-
mindedness has taken place in the philosophy of education
literature, particularly in the work of Hare (Hare 1979, 1985; Hare &
McLaughlin, 1998). More recent discussions of open-mindedness
have tended either to challenge (Adler, 2004; Gardner, 1996; Riggs,
2010) or to defend (Siegel, 2009; Spiegel 2012) Hare’s conception of
the virtue. Previous work on open-mindedness has focused on its
relationship to the pursuit of knowledge and of true belief as a
component of knowledge, overlooking its relationship to understanding. Whereas knowledge is concerned with discrete beliefs,
understanding involves entire subject matters. To understand a
subject, the agent must grasp its structure. I have argued that a
robust conception of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue
should account for its relationship to both knowledge and understanding (2013). Turning to the specific motive associated with
open-mindedness, I suggest that open-minded agents are motivated to give due regard to available evidence and argument when
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forming new beliefs and understandings and when maintaining or
revising already established beliefs and understandings.
In her discussion of open-mindedness, Hytten (2015) was
primarily focused on knowledge (e.g., teachers should be open to
revising their beliefs when they are in error). At the same time, in
her discussion of social justice education, Hytten often appealed to
the types of understanding that teachers need—for example,
understanding of “their own positionality in relation to inequalities” (p. 3). By incorporating understanding, alongside knowledge,
into a conception of open-mindedness as a virtue for social justice
educators, we emphasize teachers’ role not just as conveyers of facts
but as central actors tasked with fostering students’ development
while embedded within a particular community. Open-
mindedness is, thus, a virtue of social justice educators because it
disposes them to seek deeper understanding of their students, their
communities, and their fields, understanding that is indispensable
in the pursuit of social justice.
Before moving on to consider the third element of the virtue
framework (conditions for success), I introduce one further
consideration of the value of open-mindedness as a virtue in the
pursuit of social justice. Recently, the concept of epistemic justice
has received increased attention, notably in the work of Fricker
(2007, 2013), who has developed a theory of epistemic injustice.
The concept of epistemic injustice draws attention to the possibility
that students may be treated unjustly not only in their capacity as
members of democratic society but also in their capacity as
knowers. Considering epistemic justice in relation to social justice
education, open-mindedness arguably plays a role in preventing
epistemic injustice in schools. Teachers and students who are
open-minded are motivated to give proper consideration to the
epistemic claims of others, which in turn supports the aims of
democratic and social justice education. Thus, valuing open-
mindedness as a virtue for both teachers and students contributes
to epistemic justice by helping students to be treated fairly within
schools and outside of schools in broader democratic society as
students move into their role as mature citizens.
Now, let’s consider the conditions that support teachers in
following through on the open-minded motive across different
contexts. As described above, these conditions may be either
internal or external. Examining the internal conditions for success
draws attention to intrapersonal obstacles that may prevent
teachers from being open to revising their beliefs and expanding
their understandings. Take two examples: intellectual arrogance
and intellectual cowardice.
Teachers who are intellectually arrogant fail to acknowledge
that they are fallible cognitive agents whose knowledge and
understanding can be improved. This arrogance may prevent a
social justice educator from being open to considering information
that might challenge his or her current perspectives. Say a veteran
teacher has developed classroom practices that she believes best
promote fairness for all students. Periodically, students challenge
some of these practices, attesting that they are being treated
unfairly. Rather than take seriously these students’ concerns and
use the interaction to improve her understanding of her students
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and consider adjusting her practices, the teacher’s arrogance
prevents her from being open-minded.
Teachers who exhibit intellectual cowardice are unwilling to
reconsider certain valued beliefs or understandings in the pursuit
of the intellectual good. They fail to be open-minded because of
fear of opening up their commitments to revision, especially when
these commitments are important to their identities. Imagine a
novice teacher who is motivated to treat all his students fairly and
to improve his knowledge and understanding of his students, the
community and school context, and his field. At the same time, he
has strong unexamined attachments to some views about the
community where he is teaching, views that form an important
part of his identity. As he interacts with his students’ parents and
the broader community, he has the opportunity to reconsider these
views, to be open-minded. However, he is afraid of opening up
these views to examination and exhibits intellectual cowardice.
These two examples are intended to illustrate how consideration of the internal conditions necessary for success in possessing
or following through on the motive associated with a particular
intellectual virtue may help us to build more robust conceptions of
the virtues of teachers, identifying their relationship to other
virtues as well (e.g., intellectual humility and intellectual courage).
Thus far, we have considered the motives of open-minded
teachers and the internal obstacles that may challenge their open-
mindedness. Turning to the external conditions that impede or
support teachers in enacting open-mindedness allows us to introduce the importance of social context as well as individual responsibility. Teachers’ success in being motivated to give due regard to new
information in order to improve their knowledge and understanding
and in following through on this motive depends in part of the
context in which they are working. We can consider context, for
example, at school and system levels. Relevant questions include:
Do school policies limit teachers’ control over pedagogical content
or methods in ways that undermine open-mindedness? Do system-
wide assessment policies promote closed-minded practices over
open-minded ones? Do professional codes of conduct limit teachers’
interactions with students in ways that prevent open-minded
engagement? By taking seriously the external conditions that
support teachers in developing and exhibiting virtues that advance
educational aims such as social justice, we can prevent a virtue ethics
approach to teacher ethics from ignoring the role of context and the
ethical responsibilities of other actors in education systems.

Conclusion
Hytten (2015) initiated a valuable way forward in developing an
ethics of social justice educators, drawing on virtue ethics. I have
added support to this effort by arguing that a virtue approach to
ethics of teaching is in fact compatible with giving due regard to
the role of social context in teaching. I then proposed a refined
framework for considering the virtues of teachers, one that asks us
to identify virtues relevant to teaching within the broad categories
of intellectual and moral virtue. For any potential virtue of social
justice educators, we should then consider (a) its characteristic
psychology, (b) its relationship to the aim of social justice, and
(c) both the internal and external conditions for its success.
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